A number of the recommendations appear to be empty diplospeak, but here are the most noticable things about the Report of the Iraq Study Group that seem to matter

Note how Saudi Arabia and Turkey are not mentioned in the following list. Good. Kowtowing to those enemies of the peoples of Iraq has gotten us into this mess:

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq could also become members.

No War with Iran. Good. We are in a war against al Qaeda on a global scale, and with al Qaeda in Iraq and the Baath Party is Mesopotamia. Using the aftermath of 9/11 to confront Iran was a bizarre mistake.

RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany.

The victory in Iraq will not be an excuse to cease fighting, but merely recalibration. Good. Our forces must be put to better use.

RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.

The future is coming on:

RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.

Recommendations 21, 26, 27 28, and 30 would be disastrous if we were willing to enforce them. Fortunately, we are not:

RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism operations.

America is back on track.

More analysis is available from ZenPundit.

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