The Falklands War, Reloaded
by tdaxp ~ April 3rd, 2007
Recently, I’ve been in a very informative conversation with Thomas P.M. Barnett. In a series of posts, including
here at tdaxp, and
- Clinton v. Bush on the Balkans v Iraq/Afghanistan,
- Nation-building in Iraq: the good, the not-so-bad, and the ugly, and
- The side I’ve always been on
over at Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog. We disagree on the nature of a war with Iran (Tom thinks it would be disasterous, I view it more as a non-event) while agreeing on the purpose and effects of the Iraq War.
In particular, Dr. Barnett wrote:
attacking Iran overloads the Core on feedback, thus putting it at risk. I can’t grow the Core if I split it, thus my fear.
This is a reasonable concern. Iran herself is is not particularly important. However, if the developed world is hurt by an Iran War through side effects, it would be a disaster.
So we have to look to the past. Are there examples of major Core powers attacking (without plans of occupying) important non-Core powers against the wishes of other Core powers?
The best example I can think of a “Core-splitting war” was the Falklands War of 1982.
The Iran of 26 Years Ago
Here anti-communist Britain attacks anti-communist Argentina. This was during the Age of Decolonization, where violent attacks on western powers were considered legitimate if the attackers supported disconnectedness, “anticolonization,” and “national resistance.” The French defense trade press praised Argentine victories (accomplished through French weapons), while America publicly condemned both sides while secretly aiding both the Argentines and the Brits. The war ended with a victory by the British and a subsequent revolution in Argentina that overthrow the military dictatorship and ushered in democracy. (A similar thing would later happen after the NATO war against Yugoslavia.)
But what effect did this divisive war have on the Core? Only one: The Falklands War ended the Age of Decolonization. Through its (albeit unilateral and divisive) flexing of muscle, Britain demonstrate that the Core would no longer cede land to the Gap.
The Core of 1982 was more more fragile than ours today. The New Core had yet to be welcomed to the club, and America, western Europe, and Japan were still enthralled by the ideas of government control and “planning.” Yet even in this weakened state, the only “overload” in the Falklands War was the lesson that the Gap attacks the Core at its peril. But this was a change in the nature of Core-Gap interaction. The Falklands War had no impact on intraCore behavior. Just as Iran does not matter today, Argentina just did not matter in 1982.
Update: Sean Meade alerts me to Cal Thomas, Counter Currents, and the International Herald Tribune, who also use a Falklands analogy.
Tim, Based on the traditional laws of the United...
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
What assistance did the US give Argentina?
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
In 1982, to be more accurate, the US was governed by Reagan, and the Fed was still experimenting with monetarism, far from being enthralled by “planning”. Further, the UK was Thatcher'd up and also drinking the monetarist koolaid. Germany had just swung from a Social Democratic government to a Christian Democratic government. The Mitterand government in France changed course from reflation to a strong franc policy the year after.
Further, Britain didn't “attack” Argentina. Argentina initiated the war by invading the Falklands and South Georgia on the 2nd April, 1982. Even if you believe these places are Argentine sovereign territory, in the process they fired on Royal Marines stationed there, thus initiating a state of war.
At no point did UK forces attack the mainland. Although some say the SAS or SBS established observation posts near southern airbases, no evidence to substantiate this has ever been provided, although a Royal Navy Sea King Mk4 helicopter did turn up in southern Chile.
It's debatable whether Argentina was part of the Gap then or now. At the time, it had a nuclear weapons research project and an aircraft carrier – not very much like Afghanistan. It was and remains one of the most globalised of the Latin American countries, and probably counts as New Core these days.
Practically every factual assertion in this post is wrong, but otherwise it's pretty good.
To answer purpleslog, the US was notably unhelpful to the UK to begin with, under the influence of Jeanne Kirkpatrick. As far as concrete assistance to Argentina goes, I'm not aware of much, but the US certainly did not prevent other Latin American countries from supplying Argentina with arms (for example, Bolivia resold C-130s and aircraft spares).
The US provided AIM9L Sidewinders we had already ordered, and made no objection to the use of Wideawake Airfield on Ascension, but then the airfield is on UK territory and the Royal Navy and GCHQ already had a presence there. This compares poorly with France. Whatever the French trade press said, the French SDECE intelligence service helped to prevent other states and nonstate actors from selling further Exocet ASMs to Argentina.
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
In the unintended consequences category of a war on Iran, oil concerns would loom large in my mind. These could potentially affect several members of the core in undesirable ways.
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
Alex,
Thanks for your comment.
Your correctly note that the Core-Seam-Gap position of Argentina is undetermined for 1982, but that it was “one of the most globalised of the Latin American countries.” The greater the connectedness of Argentina, the more remarkable the Core's resiliency in the face of a war. If you had argued, “Argentina was so isolated from the world system that the post-war effects on the system are not comparable to what would happen after a war with Iran,” that would be a good critical point. As it is, your words buttress mine.
Your concern over the word “attack” is quibbling. Britain chose to engage in offensive operations against Argentina in the south-west Atlantic theater. Whether you call this “attack,” “counter-attack,” “liberation,” “invasion,” etc perhaps informs a philosophical question of whether the war was “Just,” but it doesn't change what actually happened.
The dismantling of the planning economy in the United States began with Jimmy Carter (in office 1977-1981) and in Britain with Margaret Thatcher (in office 1979-1990). Nonetheless, systematic changes don't happen overnight. Further, the recession of 1982 bolsters my argument by showing that the world of the Falkands War was more vulnerable to potential disruption than is ours.
I don't know why you bring in French or German economic systems. Both were relatively unchanged through this time.
I'm not sure how your point that at “no point did UK forces attack the mainland” is relevent, though hope you'll explain.
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
Mark,
Thanks for the comment!
Oil's a real factor, and perhaps the central ones. I earlier mentioned [1] that China would be a “loser” of a war, because those industrializing economies are much more vulnerable to energy fluctuations than the US, Europe, or Japan.
On the flip side, this would help move the Old Core further oil from oil, and the technological and economic infrastructure this encourages would help the New Core as well. So, for example, an increased American use of ethanol helps sugar farmers, while increased European clean-energy technologies makes those same products cheaper for Indians and Chinese.
Oil is medicine for tyrants [2], and if an Iran war helps move us off it… great!
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2007/03/31/winners-and-losers-of-a-violent-end-of-the-islamic-republic.html
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2004/12/09/removing_the_i_v_from_tyrants.html
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
wow, thanks for the link, Dan
April 3rd, 2007 at 12:00 am
Dan,
In my conservative mind (in the real sense of the word, not the political sense), I think that you downplay the role of oil on a war with Iran. The straights of Hormuz are a major choke point for oil from the gulf states and from the Saudi facilities in the eastern part of the KSA. Furthermore, the Saudi oil facilities in those areas are subsceptable to sabotage. Finally, there is the role of panic trading in the futures markets running the price of oil up. Viewed in a historic sense, most of this would be a short-term pain, as long as Saudi facilities were relatively unharmed.
That being said, one of Iran's real vulnerabilities is in the production of refined petroleum. They have the oil, but can only make so much gas, and the facilities they do have are decrepit.
Also, there are two other key points where the analogy falters.
1) We have military assets next door that are more accessible than the British Soldiers on the Falklands and those assets (our soldiers), suffer from a vulnerable supply-line.
2) Victory is less definable. With the Falklands, the Argies either did or did not occupy the islands. A war with Iran would likely be a bombing war on our part and an [increased] proxy war on their part. What is our definition of victory? Turmoil in Iran? economic collapse?
That being said, I think we should keep poking'em with a hot stick; at the very least.
PS – Falklands – great pull from the past.
April 7th, 2007 at 12:00 am
Sean,
No prob. Thanks for your (much more high profile) cite [1] as well.
ElamBend,
I agree we have exposed our neck to Iran, logistics-wise. That's why we should have withdrawn our major force in Iraq already. [2] We need to find those who oppose our enemies in that country and give them money, guns, and air cover
“Victory” in Iran would have to be the fall of the Islamic Republic. A war may or may not make sense in absence of victory — one could certainly improve the correlation of forces short of that — but it would not be “victory.”
[1] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2007/04/a_few_more_links.html
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/08/11/leave-iraq-now.html