Further, Britain didn't “attack” Argentina. Argentina initiated the war by invading the Falklands and South Georgia on the 2nd April, 1982. Even if you believe these places are Argentine sovereign territory, in the process they fired on Royal Marines stationed there, thus initiating a state of war.

At no point did UK forces attack the mainland. Although some say the SAS or SBS established observation posts near southern airbases, no evidence to substantiate this has ever been provided, although a Royal Navy Sea King Mk4 helicopter did turn up in southern Chile.

It's debatable whether Argentina was part of the Gap then or now. At the time, it had a nuclear weapons research project and an aircraft carrier – not very much like Afghanistan. It was and remains one of the most globalised of the Latin American countries, and probably counts as New Core these days.

Practically every factual assertion in this post is wrong, but otherwise it's pretty good.

To answer purpleslog, the US was notably unhelpful to the UK to begin with, under the influence of Jeanne Kirkpatrick. As far as concrete assistance to Argentina goes, I'm not aware of much, but the US certainly did not prevent other Latin American countries from supplying Argentina with arms (for example, Bolivia resold C-130s and aircraft spares).

The US provided AIM9L Sidewinders we had already ordered, and made no objection to the use of Wideawake Airfield on Ascension, but then the airfield is on UK territory and the Royal Navy and GCHQ already had a presence there. This compares poorly with France. Whatever the French trade press said, the French SDECE intelligence service helped to prevent other states and nonstate actors from selling further Exocet ASMs to Argentina.

Thanks for your comment.

Your correctly note that the Core-Seam-Gap position of Argentina is undetermined for 1982, but that it was “one of the most globalised of the Latin American countries.” The greater the connectedness of Argentina, the more remarkable the Core's resiliency in the face of a war. If you had argued, “Argentina was so isolated from the world system that the post-war effects on the system are not comparable to what would happen after a war with Iran,” that would be a good critical point. As it is, your words buttress mine.

Your concern over the word “attack” is quibbling. Britain chose to engage in offensive operations against Argentina in the south-west Atlantic theater. Whether you call this “attack,” “counter-attack,” “liberation,” “invasion,” etc perhaps informs a philosophical question of whether the war was “Just,” but it doesn't change what actually happened.

The dismantling of the planning economy in the United States began with Jimmy Carter (in office 1977-1981) and in Britain with Margaret Thatcher (in office 1979-1990). Nonetheless, systematic changes don't happen overnight. Further, the recession of 1982 bolsters my argument by showing that the world of the Falkands War was more vulnerable to potential disruption than is ours.

I don't know why you bring in French or German economic systems. Both were relatively unchanged through this time.

I'm not sure how your point that at “no point did UK forces attack the mainland” is relevent, though hope you'll explain.

Thanks for the comment!

Oil's a real factor, and perhaps the central ones. I earlier mentioned [1] that China would be a “loser” of a war, because those industrializing economies are much more vulnerable to energy fluctuations than the US, Europe, or Japan.

On the flip side, this would help move the Old Core further oil from oil, and the technological and economic infrastructure this encourages would help the New Core as well. So, for example, an increased American use of ethanol helps sugar farmers, while increased European clean-energy technologies makes those same products cheaper for Indians and Chinese.

Oil is medicine for tyrants [2], and if an Iran war helps move us off it… great!

[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2007/03/31/winners-and-losers-of-a-violent-end-of-the-islamic-republic.html
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2004/12/09/removing_the_i_v_from_tyrants.html

That being said, one of Iran's real vulnerabilities is in the production of refined petroleum. They have the oil, but can only make so much gas, and the facilities they do have are decrepit.

Also, there are two other key points where the analogy falters.

1) We have military assets next door that are more accessible than the British Soldiers on the Falklands and those assets (our soldiers), suffer from a vulnerable supply-line.

2) Victory is less definable. With the Falklands, the Argies either did or did not occupy the islands. A war with Iran would likely be a bombing war on our part and an [increased] proxy war on their part. What is our definition of victory? Turmoil in Iran? economic collapse?

That being said, I think we should keep poking'em with a hot stick; at the very least.

PS – Falklands – great pull from the past.

No prob. Thanks for your (much more high profile) cite [1] as well.

ElamBend,

I agree we have exposed our neck to Iran, logistics-wise. That's why we should have withdrawn our major force in Iraq already. [2] We need to find those who oppose our enemies in that country and give them money, guns, and air cover

“Victory” in Iran would have to be the fall of the Islamic Republic. A war may or may not make sense in absence of victory — one could certainly improve the correlation of forces short of that — but it would not be “victory.”

[1] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2007/04/a_few_more_links.html
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/08/11/leave-iraq-now.html