This is my second initial reactions post on Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, by John Robb. The second section is called “Global Guerrillas,” and contains three chapters: “The Long Tail of Warfare Emerges,” “Systems Disruption,” and “Open Source Warfare.”
This post focuses on the fourth chapter of the book, “The Long Tail of Warfare Emerges.”
“The Long Tail of Warfare Emerges” is a split effort, containing solid counterinsurgency with a definition (I think) of “global gurreillas.” The solid section covers “Paramilitaries,” or what could be thought of as an Extended Systems Adminitration Force. Both loyalty militias and security contractors are discussed in this section that runs from page 86 to 89. Sadly, the section ends with one of the one-way claims that detract from Robb’s work generally:
For every local or global failure of nation-states to address critical problems, corporate participants in general and PMCs in particular will continue to gain ground. It’s inevitable
Note in the above quote non-national states/devolutionary possibilities are not discussed (particularly gauling for an American author, who should be readily familiar with 50 quasi-sovereign states that are not nations), and that no possibility of states gaining ground on corporate service-providers is mentioned.
Right on the heels of that quote is a discussion of “Third Generation Gangs” theory,” whose quixotic use of “generation” may be of interest to 4GW and 5GW theorists.
When I first heard of the “generational gangs” concept, I wrote:
Sounds a bit buzzwordy.
“1 GEN” gangs are suppliers of public goods, mainly security. They earn a profit through taxation.
“2 GEN” gangs are suppliers of private goods, mainly drugs. They earn a profit selling these goods to customers.
“3 GEN” gangs would appear to be a sub-contractor of “1 GEN” gangs. For instance, a number of brothers who join a “1 GEN” gang together would, presumably, be in their own “3 GEN” gang among themselves.
Thus, as I think the “global guerrilla” idea itself is a bit buzzwordy, I was pleased to see that Robb writes “Third generation gangs fit the model of global guerrillas perfectly” (93). Right or wrong, at least I’m consistent in my criticism.
Robb ends the section describing global guerrillas — these subcontractors of gangs — thusly:
One thing that these hundreds, growing to thousands, of global guerrilla groups have in common is an affinity for systems disruption.
Personally, I think that one thing these gangs have in common with each other — and indeed, with all gangs — is a desire to make money. What Robb is adding to the this “3rd Generation Gang” format without mention is a belief that global guerrillas are realpoliticians, unconcerned with money except as it relates to power. Humans are so perfect though. Global guerrillas, like all men, are vulnerable to greed, pride, and vanity. Thus all angelic dreams — utopias and dystopias — are crushed on the rocks of reality. The System has cash, the State has cash, and for all their petty nuisances gangs make more money by free-riding on the State than by fighting it.
Good for the State and the System. Bad for anarchy and “global guerrillas.”