This is a good point, and one which would be valid with Israel versus most of its neighbors, but the Palestinians? Is connectivity with them really so changeable in comparison with growth? Here's a hybrid map of Jerusalem I just created with Google (nice toy. . .):

http://maps.google.com/maps?client=firefox-a&oe=UTF-8&hl=en&channel=s&q=&ie=UTF8&ll=31.7705,35.222855&spn=0.034515,0.058365&t=h&z=14&om=1

The border cuts RIGHT THROUGH an urban area! If you build a wall along that border, how easy will it be to dash out from a building to blow through that wall to raid the other side? Or tunnel under it, or send artillery projectiles over it from nearby buildings? As you answer that question, remember the extremes the East Germans had to go to to make the Berlin Wall effective just against the occasional defector in an urban environment. Can the Israelis really build a wall that'll effectively guard against guerilla raids?

You mention using sigint and humint. If you don't have Israelis on the other side on a regular basis, how effective will that be? Sigint can be foiled using runners and setting up discrete low-power telephone or telegraph lines; with no patrols, how will you intercept those runners or spot those lines? Humint would be easier so long as the Israelis maintain diplomatic ties with the Palestinians, but that has its limits.

The point to this is, the control one has over connectivity with another- be it another person or another nation- is dependent on distance. When you have deserts, or mountain ranges, or large bodies of water between you, connectivity is easy to reduce. A tariff or sanction here, a navy or airforce there and don't forget the army. But when you're in each other's armpits (like the Israelis and Palestinians are), reducing connectivity requires drastic measures that usually hurt both sides. You're left with the choice of a) increasing that distance (ethnic cleansing, in this case), b) taking the pain and living in misery (the status quo in the Middle East) or c) trying (often unilaterally) to improve communications and relations with the other party (my suggestions).

As for the growth question, remember that I'm talking about gradually increasing connections between the Israelis and Palestinians over years and decades. Palestinians move into Israel, they get access to western-style educations, communications and concepts; their ability to grow improves. Israel cooperates with (presumably) Fatah to eliminate Hamas, the more retroactive Palestinian party gets destroyed and the less retroactive party coopted– forced to keep up with the Israelis standards just to maintain their alliance. Cooperation between the two groups on other matters of interest just forces them to keep up in other ways as well, as does trade.

In short, in the case of the Palestinians from a hypothetical Israeli point of view, it is growth that's easy to change and connectivity that's hard to change.

If I was in the Israelis' shoes, I'd pick the path where I'm blamed for doing things that actually help people on both sides now.

Why?

This is a serous question. It is not clear to me how empowering the one population that has a chance to destroy your state as it is makes sense.

If your response is that it's the right thing to do by the Palestianians, it makes perfect sense as a Palestinian demand.. but not Israeli policy
If your response is that it will reduce terrorist attacks, I'd ask you to compare the probability of success / costs to, say, just building a wall, humint, and sigint capabilities

What is the answer?

–

If I was in the Israeli's shows, I'd pick the path where I'm blamed for doing things that actually helps Israel. That inolves recognizing what you can change (degree of connectivity between yourself and enemies) and what you can't change (universal lack of normal growth in any Arab state).

I guess it basically comes down to a question of appeasing a hostile population v. counter-balancing any attacks.

As economic growth tends to make inequality worse and increase friction, at least in the short-term, a transitioning Palestinian economy may not even be in Israel's interest (as long as the Jews remain a reliable scapegoat).

If you look at my first post in this thread, I wasn't talking about accepting just any Palestinian– far from it. A Palestinian would have to have a clean record, a willingness to be searched for weapons and weapons parts on his way in and be willing to live by Israeli laws to be admitted. Given the comments in this article, learning Hebrew would likely have to be a part of this kind of policy too (it would be practical in any case). I've also heard that the Israeli Arab community is pushing for an end to exceptions (including their own) to Israeli draft laws; this would mean that any Palestinian immigrants would have to join the Israeli Army for a stretch and risk going to war against their own people.

Your last comment makes sense. Until that happens, though, there are a lot of Palestinians who can't work and are prime recruiting material for assorted terrorist groups. Setting up a process whereby the better behaved get through the wall to new lives at least reduces the number of recruits and maybe convinces some youths to take different directions with their lives.

I read the article too. The concern is that matrilineally “Jews” may not self-identify as Jewish and may have no desire to join broader Jewish/Hebrew society. (The BBC piece particularly mentions “Jewish” Nazis, though African and Asian Jews-of-convenience are certainly implied, as well).

To read an article that concerns immigrants who do not assimilate (these “Jews”) as advocating the absorption of a large number of hostile immigrants (Palestinians) is a stretch, I think.

Before the Intifada and Arafat's return, Israel allowed day labor to easily come and go from the territories. If things settle down, I imagine a similar situation would return.

I'm thinking about a gradual process whereby Israel and Palestine would become the same country only when both parties are ready for it. It would be a generational process, much like a North American Union would be.

It's a process of gradual gap closing. You open up connectivity between the Core and the Palestinians via the efforts I proposed. Filters would still be needed on connectivity, but they do get more and some of the demographic pressure (angry unemployed young people in refugee camps) gets reduced. Helping one Palestinian faction win their internal power struggle reduces the pressure further, reduces the opportunity for outside interference and makes Israelis themselves safer.

Reducing the number of Palestinian pawns available and showing greater concern for the Palestinians also has the side effects of making it harder for Arab governments to use Israel as a scapegoat and foreign battleground for their conflict with the Iranians. This helps force said governments to reform a bit faster.

Pressure is reduced in many ways– but it isn't eliminated. Angry young men would still exist, violence would still happen. The Israelis and Palestinians wouldn't be coming to a Constitutional convention the day after. But the way would be cleared for more progress in pressure reduction to be made by the next generation of leaders– pacts of cooperation, perhaps, with the Palestinians on matters of mutual interest is one possibility.

Call it 5GW, draining the swamp, sysadmin with a VERY long term focus, or whatever. It is recognizing that if Israel is to survive in ANY form, it has to start sending positive energy into the feedback loop as well as negative.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7070868.stm