China’s growing stake in Africa changes the calculation of our relationship with Taiwan, and our Big War force in general.
“Hedging” against Chinese aggression to Taiwan by maintaining, and publicly emphasizing, our naval deterrent is important. China invading Taiwan would be a disaster similar to Germany invading Belgium in 1914: whether there is a response or not, a stable world system ends.
That said, China’s investment in Africa essentially means that Beijing is opening up a “second front” against the Gap: not only is globalization not Americanization, the globalization of the gap will not primarily be because of Americans: it will be because of new Core powers like China.
Clearly, the worst thing that could happen would be if Chinese and American influence in Africa turn against each other, and lead to the destruction of governments in the way that American influence took down the Soviet, British, French and French colonial and neocolonial regimes. Thus, we need to be careful that our “hedge” around Taiwan doesn’t become a “wedge” in the shrinking of the Gap.
Diplomatically engaging China over absurd or wrong policies is good, but the military should not be part of the toolkit. Pressing Beijing over its persecution of political dissidents, religious minorities, and others is good: pushing China in a way that alters her posture in Africa is not.
All talk of a “hedge” against a rising China must be balanced against the concern of putting a “wedge” in our efforts to shrink the Gap.