Memory Classics
by tdaxp ~ January 16th, 2008
Read several papers fo rhte first week of a seminar on memory and problem solving.
Tulving argues for the existence of three memory systems: procedural, declarative, and episodic. One might call these explicit, implicit, and self-centric memories. I’d question why three systems: two memory systems is a good approximation for dual processing, multiple memory systems is probably closer to the truth… hacking out unique category for self-centered memories seems like special pleading.
Baddeley goes over his “Working Memory” theory, but this appears to be an earlier version, without an episodic buffer.
Miller reviews his research on working memory’s capacity for 5-9 chunks of information at a time, as well as studies by other authors showing about the same thing. Very interesting, but clearly from an earlier wave of cognitive psychology: he views information processing as very litteral – not analogous to, but the same thing as, information processing in a computer.
Craik and Lockhart go over their old “level of processing” perspective, which rejects the long term memory / short term memory, instead focusing on a very large number of “levels” of memory. Their arguments can be reinterpreted as arguing for an arbitrary number of interactions between System 1 (orientation) and System 2 (decision) in cognition.
Bibliography:
Baddeley, A. (2004). Working memory. In D.A. Balota & E.J. Marsh (eds.). Cognitive Psychology, New York, NY: Psychology Press, pp. 139-
Craik, F. & Lockhart, R. (2004). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. In D.A. Balota & E.J. Marsh (eds.). Cognitive Psychology, New York, NY: Psychology Press. pp. 114- 131.
Miller, G. (2004). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. In D.A. Balota & E.J. Marsh (eds.). Cognitive Psychology, New York, NY: Psychology Press pp. 2- 18.
Tulving, E. (2004). How many memory systems are there? In D.A. Balota & E.J. Marsh (eds.). Cognitive Psychology, New York, NY: Psychology Press. pp. 362-373.
January 17th, 2008 at 12:00 am
Good points fl.
It's also not clear to me why self-knowledge isn't just a special case of person-knowledge, or even agent-knowledge. I know way more about myself (maybe) than anyone else, but it would seem to be the same sort of interpretation.
January 17th, 2008 at 12:00 am
“hacking out unique category for self-centered memories seems like special pleading.”
I agree that a separate category for self-centered memories doesn't make much sense, especially in the field of educational psychology, where theorists of memory (especially Baddeley) hold that memory (whether working or long-term) begins with perception. Perception (at least as they imagine it) is a rather self-centered process ANYWAY, so it seems that (again, in these theorists' models) memory is, by definition, self-centered.
January 17th, 2008 at 12:00 am
Hmm. And then we wind up getting into philosophical questions about whether “I” am the person I know myself to be, or whether “I” am the person others know me to be. But I agree, self-knowledge does seem to be a subset of person-knowledge.