Transforming the SysAdmin
by tdaxp ~ March 18th, 2008
A very good article from Newsweek about how the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars are changing the Army and Marines:
When Wright wrapped up his tour in 2005, he wrote an article in Infantry Magazine, an Army publication, criticizing the traditional “light infantry” tactics that had flopped in Afghanistan. He recommended more-flexible approaches, like mixing with the locals and (more implied than directly stated) buying off the enemy. When Petraeus drafted his counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006, he was able to draw on the experiences of resourceful frontline officers like Piatt and Wright. “All the stuff in the Petraeus manual, we had kind of figured it out there [in Afghanistan],” says Wright. “It was all the stuff we had seen work on the ground.”
American officers learned very similar lessons in battling the Viet Cong. But much of that knowledge was simply lost. “It’s said we fought that war nine times, a year at a time,” says Petraeus, noting that because they had been drafted rather than volunteered, many combat-hardened troops left the Army as soon as their yearlong tours in Vietnam were up. By contrast, with the Army stretched thin and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dragging on, soldiers like Wright find themselves heading back into the fight for a second (or third or fourth) tour. “They have a level of experience that I don’t think our Army has had at that rank certainly since Vietnam, and maybe not even then,” says Petraeus.
Petraeus has institutionalized that knowledge. Herding a team of researchers at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, he was able to get his manual written and approved about three years after the invasion of Iraq, lightning speed in Pentagon time. But even Petraeus says that the much-lauded document can provide only principles to follow. The hard work is still being done in the streets of Baghdad. “What they’re dealing with is much more complex and much more nuanced than what we were trained to do when I was a captain,” he says. “You have to understand not just what we call the military terrain … the high ground and low ground. It’s about understanding the human terrain, really understanding it.”
In order to shrink the Gap, America needs to transform its Leviathan big-war force, and the Military-Industrial-Complex that supports it, so that it stands-up a SysAdmin counter-insurgency force, and a Sysadmin-Industrial-Complex to enable it.
The longer the Iraq and Afghan Wars, and those like it, continue, the more the Army and Marines will be transformed into the “occupation” fighting-forces we need.
This is one reason why it’s so important to continue the Afghan and Iraq Wars until those states are successfully processed. Only one candidate this cycle, John McCain, is straightforward enough to both plan on continuing the wars, and letting his plan be known.
March 18th, 2008 at 6:16 pm
Dan,
Yes, the wars are transforming our military into a 5GW-SysAdmin force, but it is not transforming the government of the United States into supporting our 5GW-SysAdmin with the MISC. That must come from the top-down, and thus will have to wait until the next administration.
However, consider the possibility that since the military bears the burden that the rest of USG cannot support, the learning curve is too steep. We have maxed-out our brigades, we have destroyed our equipment, and we have no serious allies. We can lower the violence in Iraq but can’t get the ball rolling on reconcilation w/o the rest of USG seriously getting its act together. By overextending ourselves in Iraq and forcing stop-loss and 15-month rotations, we are destroying the moral and mental faculties of our military personnel. PTSD is rampant among the enlisted.[1] Soldiers who can’t get their heads straight because they have been overused cannot be expected to learn COIN. It takes a level of self-restraint and self-control to separate insurgents from civilians, and soldiers who have been morally and mentally exhausted should not be expected to make this distinction. The longer we burn the candle from both ends with 5GW in Iraq and Afghanistan and no support for the military from the rest of the government, the less successful will be the transformation to an COIN/occupation force.
The only choice is to drawn down from Iraq in Summer 2009. There is nothing more we can do in Iraq at this point without destroying the military. Afghanistan is (and always has been) the true center of gravity.
[1] See “Captain Kearney’s Quagmire.” NYT Magazine. Feb. 24 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin
March 18th, 2008 at 6:22 pm
A high-level reply: the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are not 5GW. The 5GW, to the extent one is being waged, is to build the Military-Industrial-Sysadmin-Complex.