[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/06/07/defenses-against-4gw-what-xgw-theory-says.html
[2] http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/05/31/militia-2/

Are you looking for absolutes and clean singularity breaks? [1] But even Lind suggested that some things carry over from one generation to the next and to the next.

I’ve previously introduced the idea of “refinement” (most recently in a comment at Dreaming 5GW branching off from this tdaxp post [2] ) IMO, we should be able to talk of “ishness”, or the appearance of xGWish features in much older wars, without diluting the purity of our modern-xGW theory via the discovery of nominally “incomplete” versions much earlier in history.

Nor should the appearance of some xGW attributes in xGW+1 or xGW-1 lead to the utter collapse of the xGW theory. Indeed, as I understand it, the inter-generational conflict, because it occurs within a given epoch, may make for muddy waters during the transition or conflict, but the refinement that occurs partly as a consequence of this conflict resembles emergence — that is, the unique confluence of many things leads to the emergence of a particular xGW that may be distinguished from xGW-1 and xGW+1 even if those also have some features in common.

[1] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/the_thunder_pig_thunders.php

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2008/05/xgw_as_a_system_for_the_classi.php#comment-979

That said, replacing the term with dispersal of kinetic violence…

How is that [dispersal of kinetic violence] sufficiently different between generations to make such generational distinctions possible? How do I know that the [dispersal of kinetic violence] isn’t a symptom of some other social/political/economic/technological process that might be the real cause for the differences in generation?

The difference is quantitative, and should be measurable. Obviously, all things have causes, so certainly a variety of things can shift a war to this stage of xGW or that.

I am more comfortable with Abherring’s doctrinal explanation, although I have differences of opinion as to which generation a particular type of war might be (strategic bombing, etc…)

Perhaps the best way to consider it is that the stages of XGW are defined by the dispersal of kinetic violence, and the dispersel of kinetic violence in turn lead to certain features that may be captured by Aherring’s descriptions. The two approaches are complementary, which is one reason why our group blog [1] works so well.

I think attacking critical infrastructure (ball bearing plants, POL facilities) qualifies as attacking weakness.

Attacking critical capital infrastructure by pulverizing a ball bearing plant is no more (or less) attacking a weakness than attacking critical labor infrastructure by pulverizing a trenchline.

Not to mention that a 2GW solution to defeating enemy production is to produce more yourself.

No more or less than a 2GW solution to defeating an enemy line is to produce more conscripts.

Symmetrical attacks can take the form of either increasing your strength on an axis or decreasing the enemy’s strength on the same axis. This is true whether you are talking about capital, land, or labor.

Also, most 3GW treatises allow for concentrations of kinetic firepower, which might be mistaken for attritive methods. MCDP-1 specifically allows for this.

This recalls the different levels of analysis in war, strategic, operational, tactical, and so on. Certainly a fight that in one level of analysis may be usefully thought of as some form of XGW may be thought of as another form on another level.

[1] http://dreaming5gw.com/

“Attrition is a 2GW characteristic. Strategic bombing, has historically used, is 2GW. Against an opponent that can organize the production of large quantities of goods, going after production is attemping to wear-down a strength, not exacerbate a weakness.”

I think attacking critical infrastructure (ball bearing plants, POL facilities) qualifies as attacking weakness. Whether it was successful is another matter, but the targeting process of strategic bombers emphasized the attacking of industrial weakness. Douhet’s Command of the Air emphasized this, notably at the same time as most other 3GW pioneers (Rommel, Guderian, Liddell Hart, JFC Fuller, even Ernst Juenger) were writing their works.

Not to mention that a 2GW solution to defeating enemy production is to produce more yourself. Likewise a 2GW use of strategic bombing would be to strategically attack armies from the air. Douhet and other emphasized attacking critical nodes in the means of production (strength v. weakness).

Also, most 3GW treatises allow for concentrations of kinetic firepower, which might be mistaken for attritive methods. MCDP-1 specifically allows for this.

I am more comfortable with Abherring’s doctrinal explanation, although I have differences of opinion as to which generation a particular type of war might be (strategic bombing, etc…) The feature/bug of this approach is binding of the generations of war to the intellectual history of war–something I have no problem with and certainly an approach with some merit. Note that this is still remotely connected with the social/political/economic/technological, but not as closely tied as Lind’s framework.

Such an approach would allow for the generations of war to coexist in different forms throughout a larger span of history than merely the gunpowder age, yet would also recognize the incompleteness of, say, 2GW styles of war prior to the Industrial Revolution.

As far as Liddell Hart goes, I would say that his indirect approach is possibly analagous to offloading of violence–although I’ve already stated my uncertainty of the definition of offloading. I think this might be graphically depicted better, which is what prompted the comment that we should be in a bar–because then there would be plenty of napkins to write on. Anyways, I’ll stew on this some more and see if I can find a better way of expressing this. I know my thesis to be correct intuitively, but don’t yet have the words to express myself.

I agree! It would be nice to do this face to face, but thanks to the magic of the Internet we can have a discussion that would have otherwise geographically impossible. All here deserve a great deal of thanks but particularly you Smitten Eagle for your insight and especially Dan for the forum.

Smitten Eagle,

Dan defined XGW offloading as this; “XGW measures the offloading of kinetic violence (reducing the kinetic intensity), not the offloading of the war effort.” I take this to mean the effects of the kinetics are dispersed in ever wider affects and effects. I don’t think this is wrong and I think it is one way to express how Generation ‘X’ is dislocated by ‘X+1′. I have read Strategy, and I don’t think Liddel-Hart’s indirect approach fits very well into this concept. Perhaps ‘offloading’ is an incorrect term or perhaps it needs to be better defined but I don’t think Dan is wrong in this.

Dan,

“Nations and groups are all capable of every form of XGW, though with individuals you have the conceptual question of whether or not organized violence can exist withou an organizaiton.”

I agree, all forms of XGW are possible. I think that applies to states, groups, or individuals. With XGW it is the way the violence is organized that is important, not the way the group or individual is organized.

I’d like to put in my two cents on this point. I have been trying to reconcile two versions of 0GW, firstly the genocidal warfare of ultimate survival, and secondly the very personalized warfare of individuals who fight for themselves in order to gain status and the right to continue their genetic line.

Dispersal of kinetics, not motive, defines a stage of XGW. Nations and groups are all capable of every form of XGW, though with individuals you have the conceptual question of whether or not organized violence can exist withou an organizaiton.

Curtis,

Thanks! I love your summary [1]:

Seizing upon the idea that 5GW will be an “event horizon for warfare theory”, Dan tdaxp agrees, “with one change: 5GW is the event horizon, beyond which the xGW framework breaks down as violence is dispersed and action indirect enough that the study of war becomes the study of politics.”

A lively discussion ensues, during which William Lind’s “generations of modern warfare” (GMW) — an important precursor to study of 5GW — is distinguished from “xGW”, to which 5GW belongs. 0GW – 5GW are more properly seen to exist through the framework of xGW than through Lind’s GMW.

A short form would be wonderful!

Smitten,

Yet violence in each succeeding GW is more intense than in the previous GW. In WWI, the fighting was mostly 2GW in nature, with concentrated violence along the fronts. In WWII, a largely 3GW war, violence was both more intense and less concentrated, extending to the industrial areas. In Vietnam, a 3 & 4GW, the violence was even more intense than WWII (look at tonnages of bombs dropped in VN vs. WWII–you will be surprised to find that far more firepower was used in VN as WWII, even if you add in the atomic bombings). In VN the violence was even more intense, yet less concentrated.

This is an area where I have to agree with Lind – the 3GW components of WWII were relatively fleeting, while most combatants eventually “industrialized” their forces by relying on the mass-production potentials of 2GW. Thus, perhaps, the first Battle of France saw German 3GW victory against a superior 2GW opponent, but the Pacific theater ended with that ultimate ranged weapon (the nuclear bomb).

Ironically, Victor Davis Hanson in his book “Carnage and Culture,” claims that the institution of the Flower War prevented the Aztec from dealing with Cortez as they should have. Hence Cortez conquered Mexico with a few hundred Europeans with firearms. It seems the Aztec were incapable of genocidal war.

I don’t follow this. Being accustomed to easy limited vicotires in 1GW hardly secures one against a general revolution against tyrannical rule supported by an wholly unexpected offshore balancer.

Smitten & Aherring:

S.E.:

-Strategic Bombing is [3]GW–it’s very nature is the deep raid, bypassing strength in armies to attack weaknesses in industrial production (whether this was effective is an open question, however.) It’s nature is also to attack the will of the enemy (again, effectiveness is open for debate.) It did not attempt to destroy armies through attrition, which would be 2GW.

A.:

You are absolutely right. Strategic Bombing is a 3GW doctrine. But this is the only point I will conceed.

Attrition is a 2GW characteristic. Strategic bombing, has historically used, is 2GW. Against an opponent that can organize the production of large quantities of goods, going after production is attemping to wear-down a strength, not exacerbate a weakness.

Smitten,

As far as the “offloading of violence” theory goes, that book has already been written. “Strategy,” by Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (kickass name).

He uses a different terminology (he calls it “the indirect approach”). It might be worth a read.

I have not ready Hart’s book. However, wikipedia’s summary [2] implies it is quite different from XGW. If indeed Hart is claiming that “Direct attacks against an enemy firmly in position almost never work and should never be attempted” (to follow the summary), he is confusing efficiency with effectiveness, which I discussed earlier.

The criticism of the book usually relates to The Indirect Approach being too broad a definition to really say anything substantive–it can be overlayed onto almost any battle and say whatever you want it to mean.

Indeed, which is why definitions are important, and why I provided them. XGW defines its variables (every higher XGW are more dispersed kinetic violence) and a makes a prediction (higher XGW forces should tend to prevail over lesser XGW forces. As with any such theory (including ones such as, better trained forces should prevail over lesser trained forces, forces with better materiels should prevail against forces with lesser materials), of course, describes a strength, not a sure way to victory.

[1] http://www.5gw.phaticcommunion.com/2008/05/5gw_as_the_event_horizon.php
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basil_Liddell_Hart