You cannot safely have civilian suborbital space flight capabilities without creating and deploying a thin skin system to shoot one of them down if they either lose control and head for someplace important or if there’s a hostile takeover with the same result.

Excellent point!

While I think the debate about AMB makes sense in the context of Russian aggression (such as Czechia’s missiles-for-treaties proposal [1,2]), you make a good point that the world does not stand still: new uses (and fears!) of ABM are emerging over time.

[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7792553.stm
[2] http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2008/12/happy_hour_links_16.asp

You cannot safely have civilian suborbital space flight capabilities without creating and deploying a thin skin system to shoot one of them down if they either lose control and head for someplace important or if there’s a hostile takeover with the same result. Whatever the actual threat of Iran, we’re headed to a world where suborbital ballistic launches are going to be happening outside of the control of any trusted national military.

Threads like this are why I blog!

“It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States’ nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia’s arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China’s nuclear forces. Unless Washington’s policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China — and the rest of the world — will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come.”

The ABM stuff in Europe and North America would only be needed to mop up the few loose nukes that we didn’t get on the first strike. Russia’s second strike capability has seriously eroded since the end of the Cold War and we could probably nail their few operational subs before the subs even sailed.

[1] http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html

Since the ABM components in Europe will not be effective against Russian nukes targeting the US or even Europe, it represents no significant threat to MAD. Furthermore, even the North American based system has inadequate capability to even affect a MAd-world first strike calculation – especially since the US and Russia have submarine based retaliatory capability.

What the ABM system really does is move the nuclear threshold to the countries in which it is deployed. Since the ABM system will presumably be considered a strategic asset, an attack against it will be considered a strategic attack on US nuclear assets, with corresponding consequences.

Hence it represents no threat to Russia, UNLESS Russia attacks the non-threatening ABM system. Thus the system extends the US nuclear umbrella to the area in which it is deployed, without adding any offensive capability.