Military Size, in the Core and the Gap
by tdaxp ~ September 7th, 2008
Does the number of men you train to kill other men predict whether you are a Core state or a Gap state?
An essential problem, given the tasks that lie ahead (Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog)
I see essentially four million-man armies out there: U.S., Russia, India, China. A fifth wheel would be NATO (with the body core really being Turkey).You put those resources in rough combination (frenemies competing and collaborating economically and security-wise) and there’s no question that there’s enough Core-wide resources to pool against the tasks of shrinking the Gap. You put them largely at odds with each other, then the hedging requirements will gobble up most of the important budget, and in the U.S. that means a Leviathan that continues to grab the lion’s share of acquisition, keeping emerging SysAdmin capabilities as strict lesser-includeds.
So here’s my problem: China buys for Taiwan, India buys for Pakistan (and vice versa), and Russia optimizes to intimidate its near-abroad but may soon–if we play this wrong–redirect for the West. The U.S. already still spends way too much hedging on the past, and with a “league of democracies” mindset, will likely hold onto that strong bias, meaning we inevitably sub-optimize and sub-perform on any SysAdmin jobs in the Gap, thus encouraging more competition (Why trust the U.S. to get it right on stuff you find vital? and/or Why not challenge or compete directly with a tied-down/perceived-as-incompetent U.S. in these venues?). The more that proxy war/quasi-imperialistic competition kicks in, the heightened mistrust makes for even more intra-Core hedging (and spending) by all involved.
Meanwhile, I see essentially five million man armies – China, the United States, India, Russia, and North Korea. If the quoted post was serious, we should realign our strategy with a view as North Korea as an ally in helping to shrink the Gap. Obviously the author of the quoted post opposes this — he advocates war with North Korea.
But of course North Korea is a Gap state. That Pyongyang trains a lot of men to kill doesn’t make it a Core state. Likewise, Russia is a Gap state. That Moscow trains a lot of men to kill doesn’t make it a Core state.
Reading the quoted post, I feel like I’m back in 1990, reading some columnist who says “This is the perfect opportunity! Saddam Hussein is a New Core political, generating New Rules! What… are you going to let Kuwait set our foreign policy?”
If I’m wrong, tell me why.
Pathogenic load reduces...
September 7th, 2008 at 1:45 pm
It’s good to see you’re coming around on this Barnett stuff!
I don’t think Barnett is all bad. He’s been particularly useful in describing the economic situation between the Core and Gap, and how that impacts our policies. The entire concept of the Core and Gap is a huge innovation, and we owe Tom a great debt for this.
However, his prescription for how the Gap is to be shrunk is wrong. Armies aren’t for Gap Shrinking. They are for destroying. Whatever creative destruction comes out of the army is a bonus, but counting on that creativity from the army is like thinking a new, gleaming New Orleans would come out the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina. Katrina certainly destroyed large chunks of New Orleans, and a new city is being built, but not by Katrina.
Furthermore, your point that if Tom were serious, we would be allied with North Korea, as they have a far bigger army than South Korea, and therefore we might co-opt them to do nation-building in central Asia. This is obviously absurd.
September 7th, 2008 at 3:10 pm
On the subject of Dr.Barntet’s blog site, I noticed that the link to here is no longer in the list of recommended sites.
Is this an accident or an editorial comment on your reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia?
The link to Andrew Sulllivan is still there even though the last time I could force myself to read crazy Andy’s site, he was still flogging the meme that Sarah Palin pretended to be pregnant with Trig Palin (born April 18, 2008) in order to conceal that her daughter was pregnant. Sullivan is a smart guy but he seems kind of ignorant about how this baby stuff works among the breeder females. It is not possible for a woman who gave birth to full term infant in April to be five months pregnant four months later.
Maybe after the election some of this crazyness will die down.
September 7th, 2008 at 3:31 pm
Smitten Eagle,
Absolutely agreed in the importance of Tom’s concepts.
I think actually Tom agrees with you, on the limits of US armed forces. The role of the armed forces in Tom’s work, if I remember right, has always been for (a) processing politically bankrupt states and (b) disaster recovery. The military can keep awful outcomes from occurring, and providing the security that is necessary for other activities, but they only enable some creative processes: the military itself does not create.
The only reason that posts like this one are possible is because Tom’s theory is so coherent, rich, and practical. It’s possible to criticize some statement by Tom in the context of PNM’s theory in the same way that it’s possible to criticize some statement by John Boyd in the context of Boyd’s theories. Very view thinkers get to this level, and its a testament to how serious Tom takes his work.
Mark in Texas,
Hadn’t noted that. Interesting.
In fairness to Tom, much of what he does is “activism,” in that he tries to create new realities through his connection to stakeholders and responsible parties. As far as I know, this has always been the case. [1] So message discipline is understandibly important to him.
I have the luxury of just being some guy who knocks things to understand them better. So we’re writing to two different standards.
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/04/01/pnm-theory-is-critical-theory-thats-a-good-thing.html
September 7th, 2008 at 9:54 pm
Dan,
In referencing the Deadly Viper Assassination Squad, I believe you confuse the use of coercive force (making credible but latent threats designed to change an adversary’s behavior) with brute force (military action designed to unilaterally achieve an objective, regardless of the adversary’s behavior).[1] Creating an East Asian alliance that is perceive to be united in the acceptance of Kim’s liquidation functions better as a possibility, not an inevitability. The (uncertain) threat is more useful than the act, as the act itself would instigate nuclear war on the Koren peninsula. The uncertain threat can induce a policy change and an realignment of interests, namely that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is irrational.
[1] Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, New Haven; 1966.
September 7th, 2008 at 9:55 pm
*Korean
September 8th, 2008 at 4:04 am
Stephen,
You make a good point on the dangers of a war with North Korea.
Certainly Tom has never wanted such a war with North Korea to be unilateral. Victory in it would be the foundation for a “Pacific NATO,” including the U.S. and China as the two most important countries.
To keep the analogy, a similar alliance against Russia would include several nuclear- and near-nuclear powers declaring that negotiations were impossible, that development through economic connectivity was impossible, that the assassination of Putin (and his family) was the only credible alternative to war, etc. [1]
Obviously, a much lighter line is being pushed against Russia than North Korea.
And there’s a good reason for that: North Korea may be a totalitarian state. Russia is a much more familiar authoritarian state.
But having a million-man army doesn’t make conflict with North Korea part of some intra-Gap fude. For that matter, Russia’s million man army does not give that country Core status, either.
[1] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2005/02/what_to_do_about_kim.html
September 8th, 2008 at 7:28 am
It seems that your basic issue is whether Russia is a core or gap state. Barnett is clear that he sees it as a core state. From his glossary:
>>Functioning Core: Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of more than six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil, and Russia.<<
It’s not military capabilities that make a core state. If that were the criterion, Japan (and much of Europe) wouldn’t make it. It’s not democracy that makes a core state. If that were the criterion, China wouldn’t make it. As I understand it a core state is one that accepts the connectivity associated with globalization and can handle (which doesn’t necessarily mean you accept them) the ideas flowing across the border that come with interconnectivity. It doesn’t mean a core state is good, or democratic, or liberal–just open to most of the stuff that comes along with interconnected markets and communications, and has relatively predictable security policies that don’t stray too far from the general set of rules.
(And yes, I know that last statement has qualifiers that leaves room for debate, especially when–like now–the parameters of the generally-accepted rule set are up for grabs.)
September 8th, 2008 at 7:35 am
Dan McIntosh,
Important points.
I’ve tried to untangle the definition from the description of the Gap before. [1] Perhaps you could share your take?
I think the first two sentences of what you cite are a proper definition. In that context, is Russia integrating its national economy with the global economy? No — Russia has been nationalizing and shutting-out foreigners and global rulesets at a pace to rival Venezuela. Likewise, is Russia adhering to the emerging global security ruleset? No, it’s directly challenging it by using war as a tool of diplomacy.
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/08/21/the-definition-of-the-functioning-core-and-the-non-integrating-gap.html
September 8th, 2008 at 8:43 am
Good points. I suspect that Russia has concluded that for the immediate future more formal integration, like WTO membership, isn’t as important as it used to be. Likewise, Russian stock markets have been falling, and that doesn’t seem to both Putin/Medvedev much.
There’s a window of opportunity here for Russian expansionism (or reestablishing its traditional sphere of influence, if you care to look at it that way).
One reason for that is oil. There’s a good connection between oil prices and authoritarianism among oil producers. Today, crude oil is at $108 per barrel, and OPEC suggests an oil price range from $113 a barrel to as high as $186 a barrel by 2030. GAZPROM, Russia’s monopoly, predicted oil prices could hit $250 a barrel in 2009. While that’s less likely now than it seemed six months ago, one thing that could drive up the price is a perception of political instability. In that sense, while war is bad for people who profit from production and open markets, it can be great for the state oil monopoly. We seem to have an ugly cycle emerging, and few of our potential punishments do anything more than reinforce it.
A way to break the cycle is to reduce global dependence on a few oil producers. Even if it is possible, it takes time. Hence, a window of opportunity for Russia.
As the the emerging rule set, I suspect it will look a lot more like regional blocs and spheres of influence than a global Leviathan/SysAdmin. A global system might be sold as being in Russia’s interests, but they seem to have concluded that it isn’t going to happen, so the best they can hope for is regional integration and domination. Acting on that analysis tends to be self-fulfilling.
September 8th, 2008 at 8:47 am
Dan McIntosh,
Absolutely agree on Russia’s window of opportunities, and the role that oil prices play in that. Russia is operating on a gap energy-exporting, rather than a Core wealth-creation, ruleset This makes Russia’s behavior much more understandable.
Interesting that. If so, this would be a major defeat for the vision that Tom was describing and pushing. A retreat to 19th century imperialism was the worst-case scenario the Leviathan/SysAdmin/A-Z Ruleset/etc framework was ment to avoid. If true, no wonder Tom’s so gloomy.
September 8th, 2008 at 8:47 am
typo: “doesn’t seem to bother Putin/Medvedev much.”
And, at the risk of being seen as part of the “blame America first” crowd, the unilateralism of the past eight years doesn’t help us to sell a multilateral rule set.
September 8th, 2008 at 8:56 am
Honestly, I always suspected Tom was too optimistic. The world he describes is possible, and desirable, but not the most likely. I’ve always hoped I’m wrong, and economic (liberal) factors outweigh the others. In the long run–the very long run–they may. In the short run, we do what we can to shift the odds.
September 8th, 2008 at 10:08 am
Dan,
That’s not-blaming-America-first. That’s picking up on the “modeling” meme (we modeled this behavior, so we should just expect Russia to follow it) [1], against the “conditioning” meme (we should reward good behavior, and not reward bad behavior) [2].
Of course, a meme is not the full picture. Modeling theory — which actually describes how learning systems respond to observation of peers — emphasizes that punishment is a vital tool, because behaviors that are punished are not taken as models.
If one believes in that conditioning is important in international relations, it is vital not to reward Russia’s behavior. If one believes that modeling is important in international relations, it is important that Russia is punished.
I buy Tom’s framework. It describes and predicts the emerging behavior of major countries, such as China and India, really well.
Occasionally some Portugal or the other may fall off the board, but no process has a zero error rate. Errors should fall as we go further into this process, however.
[1] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/08/answering_the_inevitable_quest.html
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/08/14/learning-theories.html
September 14th, 2008 at 6:07 pm
Just read it, finally. I don’t really see where he’s equating million-man army with Core status so much as observing why so little progress has been made in shrinking the Gap. If the people who can make a difference for the better are too busy fighting with each other, be it for good reasons or bad, there’s little difference that will be made.
September 17th, 2008 at 6:57 pm
Michael,
But is that a substantive statement?
It seems that Tom either
(a) equates large military size with being in the Core, or
(b) is simply factually incorrect when it comes to military size, or
(c) noting that intra-Core rivalry delays shrinking the Core
(a) makes sense, as Tom definition of Core seems to be shifting to simply be a shorthand for places where he does not want to send US troops under any circumstances. [1]
(b) might be possible, but Tom’s done a good job of correcting himself on factual slips, so I don’t think that’s what he meant
(c) is obvious, but does nothing for Russia, which (under the original definition of Core and Gap, at least) is in the Gap — though the map itself inexplicably includes Russia in the Core
So I’m not sure what is going on.
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/08/21/the-definition-of-the-functioning-core-and-the-non-integrating-gap.html