Kashmir is tricky…

[1] http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2009/09/28/no-more-communism-in-dprk-constitution/

“We” gave North Korea what they asked for, now look at how they misbehave anyway.”

Well, it would make more sense for Japan, South Korea, and China to hash it out amongst themselves since they will face the majority of the blowback regardless of the outcome. We are stuck as the “Leviathan” on that one. And if North Korea’s threats and near-attacks on Japan’s territory and interests continue, who knows what the Japanese posture might be like in 3-5 years?

I agree about Afghanistan. It would seem that the problem of Pakistan looms larger anyway, and that is one where our push on Kashmir in the future may end up doing more good than anything else, leading either way to a “pro-India” future as Barnett and Kaplan would suggest.

It definitely appears that Obama is pushing for the United States to act as an offshore balancer, able to influence regional balance of powers to act in our interests, rather than an ‘engaged’ power as we were during the Bush administration.

Obama’s problems with General McChrystal may be symptomatic of this. He named the General out of a desire to win the war. But strategically, he may not really care. Winning a war in central asia, at the cost of being a grounded power in Central Asia, may be too expensive for Obama.

I don’t get how our North Korean posture relates to this, unless our direct meetings of North Korea are simply a precursor to abandoning the issue to China, South Korea, and Japan.

As I heard him, I thought of your comment on this post about subsidiarity. He let the French and British pound on the Iranians, as well as the Saudis and others in the neighborhood. With Zelaya, while the State Dept. issued a putrid denouncement of the current gov’t's legitimacy that may cause serious issues in the near future, I was heartened by Zelaya staying at the Brazilian embassy, not the Chavezismo compound. That tells me that as from the beginning, the US has largely let Brazil and Mexico control the debate and messaging on the matter. Our competence may be in question, but our attempt at letting them handle it seems to be a wiser move in the long run.

I hope that’s the plan.

If it is, the idea is to force states to do more to maintain their own security. In other words, it is the unraveling of the global security guarantee that began on August 8, 2008 [1]

The harmonization of our interests with China would be another example of this. [2]

[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/11/18/supplier-failure.html
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2009/05/06/obamas-brilliant-foreign-policy.html

If ultimately the US looks good by not overtly supporting the ‘coup’ while at the same time Zelaya stays out of power because of his own intransigence. In many ways it comes as a win-win.

One problem, though. Other states will want to resist Chavista influence. To whom do they look? Not the US; not the OAS. Honduras had strong enough internal institutions to resist, but what about Nicaragua?

Relying on regional powers and institutions is one thing (and Bush did so in Asia – Indian and Australia being the agents there), but if those institutions or states aren’t up to the job, the US has to exert its backstop power a little better.

Presuming that Clinton really has a say in this, and Obama isn’t a dangerous leftist on the international scene, all we need to do is wait until the new election, after which time the question of the sitting duck presidency ceases to matter much.

Alternative, if Clinton is jerking along Zelaya, his increasingly unhinged statements (“generalized violence,” etc) are a great way of marginalizing him.

[1] http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=102199&sectionid=351020706
[2] http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-01-voa7.cfm

It appears HRC has attempted to trap Zelaya into a fait accompli.

http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2009/07/31/a-tip-of-the-hat-to-hillary.aspx#comments

“Now Zelaya–who had already started to organize a “people’s army” to take back his office by force–is faced with an unsavory choice: Does he serve out his term respecting his office’s limited powers and giving up any hope to subvert the constitution to stay in power longer, or does he strike off on his own, and try to advance the chavista vision of unlimited presidential power by breaking decisively with his constitutional mandate?

By ensuring that Zelaya’s choice is presented in those terms, U.S. diplomacy has entirely shifted the dynamics of the Honduran crisis, outflanking the chavista block in the process. All of a sudden, to back the democratically elected president’s return to power is to reject the vision of unlimited presidential power that first led chavismo to rally behind Zelaya. And the authoritarian left, which had invested so much in the Honduran crisis, finds itself able to advance its vision only by declaring open war on Honduras’ broader democratic institutions.”