Tag Archives: pnm theory

Join the Core, Support Firefox!

My friend Aaron hasn’t only been my best friend since middle school, didn’t only host an early version of this blog for years, and wasn’t just my main source for circumventing the Great Firewall of China.. he also found this awesome map that compared support for Firefox with the Tom Barnett’s Core/Gap model:

In a deeper analysis, it’s further concluded:

I admit that when I wrote the post on Monday about the correlation between the pentagon’s new map and the firefox pledge download map I thought that once the per capita data was analyzed it would sharply change the outcome. The reality is, it doesn’t. Core countries are far and away dominant on the list. In the bottom half of the list (84 of the 167 countries with populations over 500,000) only 4 countries are in the core: India, China, Mongolia and South Africa. (of course as a % of Function Core, or even the worlds’ population, this is a lot of people!).

Eastern Europe is clearly an emerging open source powerhouse. Of the top 20 countries as a percentage pf population who pledged the top 3 are Eastern Europe and a total of 8 make the list. Only 4 of the countries are “non-integrated gap” countries all of which are transitioning (or arguably have transitioned, into “New Core” countries. Indeed, there is an argument that open source software allows new core countries to integrate into the core more rapidly by not only making some of the key tools that facilitate this transition more readily and cheaply, available but also by enabling the population to participate in their development thus building world class skills without the requisite FDI or multinational corporate investment.

The more grim news is at the bottom of the list. Perhaps unsurprisingly, but still another sad reminder, virtually every country on the bottom 20 is African (Bangladesh and Myanmar are the exceptions). In short, the countries most in need of this software, software that is freely available, still are least likely to have the capacity and infrastructure to download it.

Other notable placements were Venezuela (62) and Iran (77), much lower down the list than I initially suspected they would be.

Also interesting, and perhaps a possible challenge for Barnett (and the world) is that the 3 Core countries with fewest number of pledges were (in order from fewest to most) China (123), India (116) and South Africa (89)

Firefox 3 is out. It’s the fastest and most usable yet. Download Firefox 3 Now.

Is the SysAdmin Constitutional?

Volokh, E. (2007). The marines, the coast guard, and the constitution. The Volokh Conspiracy. January 28, 2007. Available online: http://volokh.com/posts/1170035957.shtml.

Eugene Volokh ponders the question: is United States Marine Corp is constitutional, as it appears to be an Army administred under the Constitutionally more generous terms given to the Navy?

The tougher conceptual question is whether the Marines can constitutionally be considered part of the constitutionally specified Navy (whether or not they are part of a federal agency labeled the Navy), or must be seen as falling under the constitutional head of “Armies.” In either event they’d be constitutional, but if they are treated under the head of “Armies,” then they’d have to be funded using appropriations that are for no longer than two years; if they are treated under the head of “Navy,” they can be funded under unlimited-length appropriations. Recall that the relevant Congressional powers are:

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy.

I don’t know the answer, but I thought I’d flag the question (recognizing that it is of little practical importance, especially these days).

Dr. Volokh then gives speculated on why the Army should be on a shorter lease than the Navy:

My (somewhat vague) recollection is that the constitutional distinction between armies and the navy stems from the fact that Englishmen of the time — including the American variety — saw land-based forces as much more dangerous to domestic liberty than sea-based forces, and sea-based forces as much more important to day-to-day national defense. That’s also why there was lots of concern about a standing army, but not about a standing navy. Modern Marines are in this respect at least potentially more like “armies” than like the “navy”; that’s why the question I pose is theoretically nontrivial.

Is Barnett’s Leviathan an updated version of the Department of the Navy (the few, high-tech, can only be deployed offshore and abroad) while his SysAdmin just an updated version of the Department of the Army (the many, the low tech, deployable at home and abroad). If an Office of Systems Administration is created, would it have to be funded for no more than two years at a time?

AfroIslamic Gap v. New Core, Reloaded

Earlier, after terrorists exported trouble from Pakistan to India, I urged readers to view the event through PNM Theory and particularly the PNM/tdaxp synthesis that sees the world divided into several zones

1. The Old Core (North America, Western Europe, Japan)
2. The New Core (Brazil, India, China, etc)
3. The Seam (Cuba, South Africa, Philippines, etc.)
4. The Non-Integrating Gap (Congo, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, etc)

The higher your country up in this list, the nicer your citizens’ lives are, the less likely they are to die of starvation, the less likely your women are likely to be raped as a tool of warfare, the less likely your child will die of starvation. All in all, it’s fantastic to be born in the Old Core, pretty good to be born in the New Core, somewhat acceptable to be born in the Seam, and a Hobbesian nightmare in the Gap.


A State in the Hobbesian Gap

Part of the Terror of the Gap is that it exports terrorism, death, and disease from the Gap to the Seam and the Core. Lebanon’s Civil War’s envelopment of Israel is yet another example of this example. We are not seeing in Lebanon “collective punishment” or a “lethal care wreck.” We are seeing something that has always existed in the world: the attempted destruction of the good by the bad. Lebanon’s export of violence and death to Israel is analogous to Afghanistan’s export of violence and death to America, or any of the other recent acts of terrorism against civilized countries.

Fortunately, the success of global capitalism teaches us how this will end: the spread of the Core to the four corners of the world, and the eradication of war as we know it. Between now and that end of history good decisions can be made, and the nature of that final peace can be tweaked this way and that. Much work is to be done, and billions of lives hang in the balance.

Yet when we see specific cases like the current Lebanon-Israel conflict, we know what’s going on: the Gap is exporting violence to the Core. If you want a true end to this mess, don’t worry about shuttle diplomacy and magic bullets. Instead: Shrink the Gap, primarily through structural economic and security connectivity.

Redefining the Gap 7, The Pentagon’s New Map

Note: This is a selection from Redefining the Gap, part of tdaxp‘s SummerBlog ’06

tdaxps_new_map_md

Thomas P.M. Barnett defines the “non-integrating gap” as those “regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule set that defines its stability” (T. Barnett 2004:xvii-xviii). Immediately he gives it a geographic description, “today, the non-integrating gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia.” Barnett writes that the “Gap” will be “the expeditionary theater for the U.S. military in the 21st century” (T Barnett 2003) of “failed states and feral cities” (T. Barnett 2004:151). The rest of the world, the “Functioning Core,” is in turn split “into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia” (T. Barnett 2005:32).

pentagons_new_map_md
This graphic originally contained the following in its caption“Problem areas requiring American attention (outlined) are, in the author’s analysis, called the Gap. Shrinking the Gap is possible only by stopping the ability of terrorist networks to access the Core via the ‘seam states’ that lie along the Gap’s bloody boundaries” (T. Barnett 2003)

Barnett takes the first step towards operationalization an entity that is otherwise just a line drawn on a map (T. Barnett 2004:inside cover). Taking Hobbes as a model, Barnett defines life in the gap as “poor” (low GDP per capita), “nasty” (low levels of political freedom and human rights), “short” (low life expectancy), “brutal” (high levels of war), and “solitary” (few Internet hosts per capita) (T. Barnett 2004:161-165).

Barnett draws from the geopolitical and North-South traditions. Barnett has written this new map is not a “’North-South’ map” (T. Barnett 2004:121) , but the similarity between The Gap and the Global South is striking. The policy implications of this have down criticism to the model (Moxham 2003). “Just as the theories of such geopolitical writers as Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman provided the intellectual underpinnings of US grand strategy during the Cold War,” Barnett’s model is accused of being an intellectual justification of a US grand strategy focusing on the Global South (Owens 2004).

As with Critical Geopolitics, PNM Theory is not just a description of the world but a prescription for the world. It is a model of both existing UN missions and “future hot spots” (Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003:890). Barnett is “the best known proponent of wide area strategy” and his theory defines “who is ‘good’ and who is not” with the clear implication of widespread preemption (Richards 2005:39-40). PNM Theory, which was was created for the Pentagon in the wake of September 11th (Chaikivsky 2002:163) has already “helped reshape the direction of future military strategy based upon a new map and vision of the world security environment” (Coderre 2003). Barnett’s books (T. Barnett 2004; T. Barnett 2006) and theories are influential inside the Department of Defense (Barone 2005; Ignatius 2005; Mazzetti 2003; Tyson 2005), and senior officers now give presentations incorporating specific PNM concepts (Ignatius 2004).


Redefining the Gap, a tdaxp series:
Redefining the Gap 1. Prologue
Redefining the Gap 2. Summary
Redefining the Gap 3. Introduction to Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 4. First Geopolitical Theories
Redefining the Gap 5. The North and the South
Redefining the Gap 6. Critical Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 7. The Pentagon’s New Map
Redefining the Gap 8. The Research Design
Redefining the Gap 9. Methods and Operationalizations
Redefining the Gap 10. Limitations and Conclusion
Redefining the Gap 11. Results
Redefining the Gap 12. Bibliography
Redefining the Gap 13. Appendix: Computer Code
Redefining the Gap 14. Appendix: National Codes

Redefining the Gap 4, First Geopolitical Theories

Note: This is a selection from Redefining the Gap, part of tdaxp‘s SummerBlog ’06

tdaxps_new_map_md

Political Geography (geographie politique) was defined in 1751 (Kristof 1985:1178), but it’s modern study was invented by Friedrich Ratzel in his description of political geography (politische Geographie) in 1897 in terms of space and position (Kiss 1942:634). Rudolf Kjellen invented the term “geopolitics” (Agnew 1995:1; Tuathail 1994:259) shortly thereafter. Kjellen was primarily interested in how geography effects the power relations of states (Osterud 1998:191) – specifically, their land and people (Tunander 2005:548).


Alfred Mahan took a nautical view of geographical power. Essentially dividing the world in a global ocean and the lands it connects, he strongly pushed an ocean-centered view of history (Shulman 1998:407). He argued for a technologically and economically adaptive view of geopolitics (Israel 1978:371; Russell 1956:227) to account for a dynamic world. Mahan’s theories became extremely influential and were publicly praised by President Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and others (Karsten 1971:589; LaFeber 1962:674).

pivot_md
The “1904” line defines Mackinder’s “Pivot” (Parker 1998:104)

Mackinder reversed Mahan’s view, focusing on lands and in particular one land: the “pivot of history” (Dodds and Sidaway 2004). This area, comprising east-central Europe, central Asia, and Russia, was thought to have a potential resource and population base to dominate the world. The pivot was surrounded like an onion by an inner crescent of the warm-water Eurasian coast and the outer crescent of the rest of the world. A geopolitical model that was contemporary to world politics when it was original presented more than a century ago (Venier 2004:330), key elements of Mackinder’s philosophy were policy throughout much of the world into the 1970s (Mayell 2004:372). Even today, “Eurasianists” inspired by Mackinder are a powerful force inside Russia (G. Smith 1999:483), despite being officially discouraged under Communism (Guins 1964:342).

rimland_md
Spykman’s “Rimland” in dashed lines (Parker 1998:125)

Spykman synthesized the views of Mahan and Mackinder. The focus was now on the “Rimland,” a renamed version of Mackinder’s “marginal crescent” (Fisher 1971:205). The Rimland hypothesis argued that a natural hegemon would form from the Rimland states (Britain, India, China, etc.). Thus, Spykman’s arguments implied that America had more in common with these states than her hemispheric neighbors to the South (Fox 1948:72). Spkyman’s theories carried an influential following well into the 1980s (Cohen 1991:552), if not beyond.


Redefining the Gap, a tdaxp series:
Redefining the Gap 1. Prologue
Redefining the Gap 2. Summary
Redefining the Gap 3. Introduction to Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 4. First Geopolitical Theories
Redefining the Gap 5. The North and the South
Redefining the Gap 6. Critical Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 7. The Pentagon’s New Map
Redefining the Gap 8. The Research Design
Redefining the Gap 9. Methods and Operationalizations
Redefining the Gap 10. Limitations and Conclusion
Redefining the Gap 11. Results
Redefining the Gap 12. Bibliography
Redefining the Gap 13. Appendix: Computer Code
Redefining the Gap 14. Appendix: National Codes

Redefining the Gap 3, Introduction to Geopolitics

Note: This is a selection from Redefining the Gap, part of tdaxp‘s SummerBlog ’06

tdaxps_new_map_md

Geopolitics helped make geography a science by focusing on the political (Unstead 1949:47) and human (Dawson 1987:28) dimensions of geography. Halford Mackinder, an influential geopolitician, described his goal as not “to predict a great future for this or that country, but to make a geographical formula into which you could fit any political balance.” (Hall 1955:109). Thus, geography is a “conditioning factor” in many parts of politics (Spkyman 1938:29). The internal (Williams 1927:142) and external (Enterline 1998:804) nature of states and how they go to war (Midlarsky 1995:224) are effected by their geopolitical position. Geopolitical analysis has survived changing constellations of great powers and technologies (Hooson 1962:20). Stable geopolitical concepts have emerged, even as academic debates on the specifics of geopolitics continue (Harkavy 2001:38).


Normative accusations have dogged geopolitics. Charges of imperialism abound (Semmel 1958:554, Kearns 1999:450), as do accusations of ethnocentricism (Gilbert and Parker 1969:229). The critics of geopolitics sometimes associate it with racism , eugenics (Tyner 1999), and even encouraging war (Griswold 1940:2).


Redefining the Gap, a tdaxp series:
Redefining the Gap 1. Prologue
Redefining the Gap 2. Summary
Redefining the Gap 3. Introduction to Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 4. First Geopolitical Theories
Redefining the Gap 5. The North and the South
Redefining the Gap 6. Critical Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 7. The Pentagon’s New Map
Redefining the Gap 8. The Research Design
Redefining the Gap 9. Methods and Operationalizations
Redefining the Gap 10. Limitations and Conclusion
Redefining the Gap 11. Results
Redefining the Gap 12. Bibliography
Redefining the Gap 13. Appendix: Computer Code
Redefining the Gap 14. Appendix: National Codes

Academic Geographers Don’t Like the Pentagon’s New Map

Glossary,” by Thomas Barnett, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/pnm/glossary.htm.

Updated Glossary of Key Terms from the Pentagon’s New Map,” by Thomas Barnett, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/bfa/glossary.htm.

Neoliberal Geopolitics,” by Susan Roberts, Anna Secor, and Matthew Sparke, Antipode, 35:5, 2003, ppg 886-897, http://faculty.washington.edu/sparke/neoliberalgeopolitics.pdf.

Denaturalizing Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of Resurgant Imperialism,” by Gillian Hart, Creative Destruction: Area Knowledge & the new Geographies of Empire, 15 April 2004, http://geography.berkeley.edu/PeopleHistory/faculty/GHart_CreativeDestruction.pdf

pentagons_mew_map_colored

Continuing my work from “Operationalizing the Gap” (which itself built off of “The Cores of Europe“), I now look at what the academic press is saying about Tom Barnett’s Pengatgon’s New Map Theory.

The results aren’t kind.


The 2003 article in Antipode is the earliest example of academic geopgrahic reaction to Tom Barnett’s theories. It is striking how much it gets its interpretation wrong, though in fairness Barnett has since clarified his work so address the reactions. The authors lump PNM Theory with a “neoliberal geopolitics,” and begin their assault…

pentagons_mew_map_md
  • The authors assert that Barnett claims the Core and Gap are perfectly continuous

    “What remains of the world is, of course, the “Functioning Core,” supposedly characterized by low levels of US military involvement and high levels of global connectivity. It oddly includes such countries as Mongolia, Bhutan and North Korea. Perhaps the Gap’s lasso could have wiggled north in the East China Sea to capture North Korea, but Barnett seems determined to maintain the Gap as a contiguous area, represented on his West/East globes as a dark blot seeping across the planet from the Caribbean to South East Asia. For Barnett there is no Gap in the Core, no Core in the Gap: no details that might disrupt his Mackinderesque bands of homogenized planetary difference.” (890-892)

    In his Blueprint for Action glossary, Barnett addresses this claim:

    course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just as there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Core defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

    However, even his older Pentagon’s New Map glossary addresses the non-continuous nature of Core and Gap:

    The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan, China (although the interior is less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South America–Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

  • The authors assert that Barnett claims the US, unilaterally, is the SysAdmin

    “This systems theory technovernacular enables Barnett to refer to the US as the “System Administrator,” a metaphor that implies that the US alone has the ability to effect the rules and settings within which the other “users” on the network must operate.” (893)

    But compare to Barnett:

    The “second half” blended force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has successfully waged war. Therefore, it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as “stability and support operations” (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), “humanitarian assistance/disaster relief” (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counterinsurgency operations, and small-scale crisis response. Beyond such military-intensive activities, the SysAdmin force likewise provides civil security with its police component, as well as civilian personnel with expertise in rebuilding networks, infrastructure, and social and political institutions. While the core security and logistical capabilities are derived from uniformed military components, the SysAdmin force is fundamentally envisioned as a standing capacity for interagency (i.e., among various U.S. federal agencies) and international collaboration in nation building.

Roberts’, Secor’s, and Sparke’s conclusion, without comment:

As we said at the start, we do not want to claim too much for neoliberalism. It cannot explain everything, least of all the diverse brutalities of what happened in Iraq. Moreover, in connecting neoliberal norms to the vagaries of geopolitics, we risk corrupting the analytical purchase of neoliberalism on more clearly socioeconomic developments. By the same token, we also risk obscuring the emergence of certain nonmilitarist geoeconomic visions of global and local space that have gone hand in hand with neoliberal globalization (see Sparke 1998, 2002; Sparke and Lawson 2003). But insofar as the specific vision of neoliberal geopolitics brought many neoliberals to support the war (including, perhaps, Britain’s Tony Blair as well as Americans such as Friedman), insofar as it helped thereby also to facilitate the planning and overarching coordination of the violence, and insofar as the war showed how the extension of neoliberal practices on a global scale has come to depend on violent interventions by the US, it seems vital to reflect on the interarticulations.

In 2004, using the cartoons of Jonathon Shapiro as an anchor, Gillian Hart continues the attack

zapiro_cartoons

Like Roberts, Secor, and Sparke, however, Hart misses the mark.

  • Hart asserts that Barnett claims the Gap must be bombed into freedom

    “The Non-Integrating Gap must, quite
    literally, be bombarded into embracing Western liberal democracy and market capitalism.
    So direct, salient, and prescient is Zapiro’s cartoon of September 28 2001 that one is led
    to wonder whether he had privileged access to these savage Pentagon cartographies.”

    Hart is refering to the A-Z Rule-Set for Processing Politically Bankrupt states, one of Barnett’s two strategies. However, as Barnett wrote in his first book:

Hart’s conclusion, without comment:

The imperatives for foregrounding what Coronil calls non-imperial geohistorical categories assume intense urgency in a post-9/11 world in which the likes of Thomas Barnett and Samuel Huntington are at the helm of producing official knowledges that bound world regions in dangerous new ways. Relational understandings of the production of space and scale are crucial for forcing attention to the mutually constitutive processes through which metropoles and (post)colonies make and remake one another. In addition, attending to interconnections that circumvent the US and Europe can be productive of fresh insights into broader constitutive processes, as well as new possibilities for social change.

I’ve only highlighted interpretations which contradict Barnett’s definitions. The rest of the articles imply these errors may be purposive. Both are clear, normative attacks against PNM Theory. They are evidence that ideologically-based research has found a comfortable home in Geography.

Perhaps the most disappointing part of this research is the lack of geographic research in Barnett’s theories, at all. There’s the odd piece which lumps him with other “imperialists” or other boogie monsters, but nothing substantive. Nothing that adds anything,

Too bad.

Operationalizing the Gap

Force Structure Will Change,” by Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney, Proceedings, October 2000, pp 30-34, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/forcestruc.htm

A Hammer Looking for Nails: The Gap, the Core, and the Final Frontier,” interview with Thomas Barnett, Raeson, 1 November 2004, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/interviews/RaesonInterview.pdf.

Viral in-coring: Seoul to Beijing,” by Thomas Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog, 4 January 2006, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002774.html.

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/glossary.htm,” Thomas P.M. Barnett, downloaded 8 April 2006, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/glossary.htm.

In this post I will try to put together an operationalization and some alternate rival hypotheses for Tom Barnett’s PNM Theory.

pentagons_new_map_md

I need to finish a research design for my Scopes & Methods class. The rough draft was on traditional geopolitics, but needed considerably work. I kicked around ways to to save it, yet I had trouble focusing on writing that just doesn’t matter. I learn so much more from blog writing than class writing that I find myself looking forward to typing in new posts, but assignments are drudgery.

Until the obvious hit me: write it as a blog post! It’s not a good blog post — it’s actually the perfect combination that doesn’t work either as a tdaxp post or as something I could hand in — but at least it gets me motivated. So today’s work discusses the Research Question, Independent Variable, Dependent Variables, and Alternate Research Hypotheses required to operationalize the Gap.

I would also like to acknowledge the work of Catholicgauze, Chicago Boys, Coming Anarchy [1, 2, 3] and The Glittering Eye in “mapping the gap.” Those posts were inspirational.


That’s easy enough to say. What’s hard is writing something in a somewhat similar style to everything else here. But I’ll try.

Research Question

“Thomas Barnett’s description of “life in the Gap” accurately predicts whether a country is in the Core or the Gap. That is, as the degree to which a state matches the criteria increases, it is more likely to be categorized as “Gap.” Further, the same is true if you look at a state’s neighbors with the same criteria. Further, the same is true if one divided the world into “Old Core,” “New Core,” and “Gap.” Further, the same is true if you look at a state’s neighbors with that criteria. Further, all of these relationships are more valid than the description’s correlation with G77 membership, “first,” “second” and “third” world membership, or categorization by the United Nations Human Development Index. If this is the case, Barnett’s “new map” is preferable to the popular models of the Global North and the Global South.”

Independent Variable

The independent variable (IV) is comprised of measures of life in the Gap’s poverty, nastiness, shortness, brutality., and solitariness, as described on pages 161-166 of Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map

The Gap Quotient

  • “Life in the Gap is poor”
    “Of the 118 countries listed by the world Bank as ‘low-income’ or ‘low-middle income’ (below $2963 per capita annual), 109 are located in the Gap.”
  • “Life in the Gap is nasty”
    “According to Freedom House’s 2003 survey of states around the world, 48 out of a global total of 192 surveyed were rated as ‘not free.’ Of those 48, 45 are located within the Gap.
  • “Life in the Gap is short”
  • “Of the 50 states with the highest life expectancy rates (76 to 83 years), four-fifths lie within the Core. However, if we are to look at 50 states with the lowest expectancy rates (37 to 57 years), all but one (South Africa) lie within the Gap.

  • “Life in the Gap is brutal”
    “No matter what list of “current conflicts” you want to work from (e.g. University of Maryland … ) you’ll come up with a number somewhere short of three doze, with 80 to 90 perfect of them falling squarely inside the Gap.”
  • “Life in the Gap is solitary”
    “A good measure of communications connectivity today is the number of Internet hosts found in a country. No surprise here: the more developed your economy becomes, the more connected your people become.”

Calculation for each portion of the value will be in the form “(x – min(x)) / (max(s) – min(x))” which will produce a 0 to 1 value for each state. After this, the five components (poverty, etc) will be averaged for a final 0 to 1 value. A higher value indicates more poverty, nastiness, shortness, brutality, and solitariness.

Dependent Variables

The Dependent Variables (DVs) will be a numeric score of how well the state actually falls into Barnett’s categories. Both a simple Core-Gap and a more complex model will be used.

DV1: Simple

Two possible values, Core or Gap, will be used. Core will have a value of “1,” while Gap will have a value of “2” Determining where a state falls is as simple as looking at PNM‘s inside back cover and seeing what side of the “Boundary of the Non-Integrating Gap” a state falls in. Alternatively, one can get the map off the web.

DV1 is expected to rise as the IV rises.

DV2: Simple Neighbors

Barnett focuses on geographic proximity in his definition of the Gap

Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just as there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Core defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

So a test should be run to see if this is a factor. The DV2 for a state will be the average of the DV1s for each of its neighbors.

DV2 is expected to rise as the IV rises.

DV3: Complicated

The more complicated version of this will differentiate the Old Core from the New Core. The Old Core, which is “anchored by America, Europe, and Japan” but “excludes South Korea,” by Old Core would seem to be

  • The United States of America
  • Canada
  • Belgium
  • France
  • Italy
  • Luxembourg
  • Netherlands
  • Germany
  • Denmark
  • Ireland
  • UnitedKingdom
  • Greece
  • Portugal
  • Spain
  • Austria
  • Finland
  • Sweden
  • Norway
  • Switzerland
  • Iceland
  • other Euro micro states

with all other “Core” states as New Core. In this version, “Old Core” is 1, “New Core” is 2, and “Gap” is 3.

DV3 is expected to rise as the IV rises.

DV 4: Complicated Neighbors

DV4 will be calculated relative to the DV3s in the same way that DV2 are calculated with DV1, for the same reason.

DV4 is expected to rise as the IV rises.

DV 5: Not Pursued

Even less defined than “Old Core” and “New Core” is Barnett’s concept of “Seam States.” His glossary defines them as:

The countries that ring the Gap–such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security, because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

I don’t think that Barnett offers a coherent definition here, so I will let this one pass.

Alternative Rival Hypothesis

A research design should have one of more alternate rival hypothesis. After all, perhaps IV and DV increase together –but an even better correrlation could be found by using something else.

It struck me that I could keep my generally geographic theme by seeking to compare Tom Barnett’s Core and Gap model with the earlier Global South model.

The Global North-Global South certainly is a good alternate rival hypothesis, because it’s one that Barnett sees as similar to but different from his. To Raeson Nyhedsmagasinet:

I studiously avoid the “North-South” concept since I have my ABC’s in South America [Argentina, Brazil, Chile], like Australia and South Africa are in the South. I try to focus on: who’s connecting up?

Yet it’s one he and Hank Gaffney previously used (in describing possible force structure strategies):

This camp sees the main foreign policy task of the next decade being the processing of Russia and China into the great power fold on our terms meaning they learn to play by our rules. Once the North is in order, the South should fall in line, especially since the rogues would not have anyone of consequence to supply them in their nefarious activities.

… [or] …

This camp sees the main foreign policy task of the next decade being the effective management of the economic and technological gaps dividing North and South. You keep the North s economic expansion on track by making sure nothing and no one in the South messes it up. When situations down there get really ugly, you do what you have to, but you avoid serious involvement unless key economic fault lines are involved.

… [or] …

The South needs help now, and if it does not get it, it will bring its pain to us one way or another. Slowing down globalization s march also will give much-needed breathing space to the New Economy s losers in the North (e.g., low-tech labor).

Perhaps Barnett isn’t describing a Core-Gap conflict at all, but just a North-South conflict. If this is the case, the specific lines Barnett draws are more a geostrategic convenience for American interests than lines that match what is happening on the ground.

ARH 1: G77

g77_map_md

Perhaps instead of Gap, the best fit for Barnett’s Hobbesian places are the members of the G77. In this ARH, G77 would be “1” and states not in the G77 would be two.”

ARH 2: The First, Second, and Third World

three_worlds_md

In the Three Worlds model, the First World would be “1,” the Second World would be “2” and the Third World would be “3”

ARH 3: UN Human Development Index

unhdi_md

The UNHDI is the most rigorous of the atlernate rival hypothesis, because it is also based on statistical information. Because like the IV in this experiment is it comprised of objective data of health, it should be strongly correlated with the IV.

This paper proposes that the Research Hypothesis of the validity of Barnett’s “new map” is true, and that all dependent variables proposed are better than any of the alterate research hypotheses. If this is not true — then perhaps we better stick to the “old map”!