Note: This is a selection from Redefining the Gap, part of tdaxp‘s SummerBlog ’06
|Nalign â€“ 2||0.01||0.58||0.43||0.4||0.55||0.67|
|Nalign â€“ 3||0.001||0.57||0.41||0.38||0.56||0.66|
|LDC â€“ 2||-0.08||0.31||0.55||0.44||0.41||0.49|
|LDC â€“ 3||-0.08||0.38||0.54||0.4||0.62||0.59|
The tables you see above are the coefficients of correlations for the models described in this series to the measures Barnett describes. This study looked at the population of all states, not a sample of states, so the margin of error is +/-0%. These numbers are completely internally valid — they describe carefully derived measures. The difference between them is significant. However, the greater question of whether or not the correct measures were used is a different subject.
Chirol from Coming Anarchy suggested that I look at the Four Flows instead of brutality, nastiness, etc. It may be that I misconstrued what Barnett meant in the passages of Pentagon’s New Map where he gives the definitions.
Regardless of the meaning of these numbers, a short discussion of the results is included below.
Brutality. This was the biggest surprise. For most measures, including Barnett’s Core-Gap and Old Core – New Core – Gap, brutality decreases in the Core. This is because the University of Maryland’s ICBP database that I used measures the countries involved in wars. Besides ignoring some sub-state conflicts, the project would this could the Kosovo War as mostly a “Core” war. After all, nearly all the combatants — America, England, etc, – are Core states.
Still, the Afroislamic Gap is the best predictor of brutality. Afromuslim countries go to war more often than any other states. The worst predictor was the Old Core – New Core – Gap model.
Nastiness. Measured through lack of political freedoms and human rights, Afromuslim states fail again. The worst measure is merely defining Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) as the Gap.
Poverty. Here, Barnett’s economic determinist model shines through. The very best measure is Old Core – New Core – Gap, and the second best is a more general Core – Gap. Interestingly, here the Afroislam model scored the worst — a reversal of our experience with Brutality — though here at least, both show a positive correlation between being in a “Gap” and general badness.
Solitude. I modified Barnett’s measure, from internet hosts in a country to internet hosts per capita. It would make little sense to call a very populous state the most connected state if only a small fraction of its population had access to the internet. The results here are the similar to the ones for poverty — Old Core – New Core – Gap the best gauge, Afroislam the worst. Interestingly, here a 1st, 2nd, and 3rd world model of the globe does better than Barnett’s simpler Core-Gap model.
Shortness. Want to die early? Move to an African or Islamic country. Only looking at the world from t he point of view of Developed — Lesser Developed — Least Developed states comes close to this. The very worst predictor is Barnett’s Core – Gap model, though Barnett’s Old Core – New Core – Gap model is only slightly better.
All in All. Averaging these scores together, the AfroIslam model remains the best for describing the Hobbesian states we fight against and for. All in all, however, the ups in one Hobbesian measure seam to compensate for the downs in others, making all of these pretty good. Still, this shows a danger of just looking at an agregate measure instead of more specific measures.
A Note on the Result. I’m not a statistician. I have advanced training in predicate calculus and relational algebra, but the pseudo-math of statistics is not my forte. I would much rather have my analysis short to pieces than for it to just sit here. Likewise, I used an extremely simple tool to run these numbers.
Please, correct me. Show me where I am wrong. And then, let’s shrink the Gap — Afroislamic or not.
Redefining the Gap, a tdaxp series:
Redefining the Gap 1. Prologue
Redefining the Gap 2. Summary
Redefining the Gap 3. Introduction to Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 4. First Geopolitical Theories
Redefining the Gap 5. The North and the South
Redefining the Gap 6. Critical Geopolitics
Redefining the Gap 7. The Pentagon’s New Map
Redefining the Gap 8. The Research Design
Redefining the Gap 9. Methods and Operationalizations
Redefining the Gap 10. Limitations and Conclusion
Redefining the Gap 11. Results
Redefining the Gap 12. Bibliography
Redefining the Gap 13. Appendix: Computer Code
Redefining the Gap 14. Appendix: National Codes