The Wary Guerrilla, Part III: Predictions

This project searches for a wary guerrilla using an ultimatum game as a tool. An ultimatum game is an economic dilemma “where one of the players can firmly commit himself in advance under a heavy penalty that he will insist under all conditions upon a certain specified demand (which is called his ultimatum)” (Harsanyi, 1961, 190).

In other words (Nowak, Page, and Sigmund, 2000, 1773):

In the Ultimatum Game, two players are offered a chance to win a certain sum of money. All they must do is divide it. The proposer suggests how to split the sum. The responder can accept or reject the deal. If the deal is rejected, neither player gets anything. The rational solution, suggested by game theory, is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share and for the responder to accept it. If humans play the game, however, the most frequent outcome is a fair share. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Ultimatum Game.

This finding has been repeatedly confirmed as existing even among atypical American populations (Bethwaite & Tompkinson, 1996) and in communities around the globe (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Gowdy, Iorgulescu, & Onyweiwu, 2003).

In some economic games, income, education, small town origin, and sex (female) increases empathy (Sautter, 2006). Men may be more favorably disposed to cooperators than females (Price, 2006) but also are less empathetic toward punished cheaters (Singer et al., 2006). Players in general are generous to helpless fellows (Oppewal & Tougareva, 1992). Likewise, there are robust distinct player types of altruists, free-riders, and generally cooperative people (Kurzban & Houser, 2005). Players reject small offers rarely but more than would be predicted by game theory (Eckel, Johnson & Wilson, 2002). Along with this, players often give more than should be expected (Thaler, 1989; Fong & Bolton, 1997). The operating assumption is that these behaviors will be exhibited by wary guerrillas, as both wary guerrillaism and these traits appear to be expressions of a pro-social orientation. Thus we propose the the following hypotheses:

1.The Wary Guerrilla is correlated with small town origin

2.The Wary Guerrilla is correlated with income

3.The Wary Guerrilla is correlated with sex

This research further advances the notion that political orientation matters. If anxiety leads one to pay more attention to politics (Wolak & Marcus, 2006), if some people are chemically pre-disposed to care about politics more than others (Carmen, 2006), and if greater partisanship leads one to vote more often (Fowler, 2006), than perhaps political orientation impacts gameplay. A positive finding here would help bridge the gap between politics and psychology. Unlike the remaining hypotheses, absolutism is not taken from a single measure, but rather from a scale calculated as follows: HOrienC = hdanger + hobey – hreward – hcompro + htradit + hwelfar + honevce + hhumnat + hetcode + hpunish. (See Appendix B for variable definitions).

4.The Wary Guerrilla is correlated with absolutism

This research also asserts than an interaction effect with organizations exists. Pre-existing group norms (Henrich, et al., 2005; Kay, Wheeler, Bagh, & Ross, 2004) and group experiences (Henrich, et al., 2001; Gil-White, 2004; Larrick & Blount, 1997) matter, and group membership can provide this. Not all groups will honestly advertise their ideology to their membership (Johnson, 2006). For some learning domains, positive reinforcement is vital (Bruning & Horn, 2000), and organization membership can provide this positive reinforcement. Additionally, insecurity has an interaction with preferences (Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2006), and it seems likely that insecurity would also cause people to join family-like organizations. Greek societies, fraternities and sororities, would thus be likely locations of wary guerrillas if wary guerrillaism is a learned behavior.

5.The Wary Guerrilla is correlated with Fraternity or Sorority Membership status

While specific religions are sometimes associated with violence in the minds of people (Abrahamian, 2002; Gerges, 1997), perhaps the real determinant is general religiosity. Ancient religious terror groups were very highly organized (Rapoport, 1984) and their analogues still exist (Rapoport, 1988). Religion has played a major role in both successful and failed liberation struggles against powerful states (Bosch, 1974; Rapoport, 1979; Husband 1988) and has been offered as a possible cause of suicide terrorism (El Sarraj & Butler, 2002). Additionally, among religious traditions where an alternative to faith is eternal damnation, religiosity may be correlated with riskier behavior (Miller, 2000). Logically, religion may indicate non-secular preferences (Euben, 2002) or secular preferences working on religious themes. Religiosity may enable even rational actors to behave in apparently irrational ways (Iannaccone, 1990, 1995, 1997, 1998). The Wary Guerrilla is an obvious candidate for a type that would engage in this behavior.

6.The Wary Guerrilla is correlated with religious feeling

The Wary Guerrilla, a tdaxp series
1. Abstract
2. Terrorism
3. Predictions
4. An Experiment
5. Results
6. Absolute Guerrilla
7. Those Who Cause Less Pain
8. Future Research
9. Political Implications
10. Bibliography