Review of “The Rebllion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the Cold War” by James Mann

Recently I finished The Rebllion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the Cold War by James Mann.

The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan is a history of Ronald Reagan’s diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev. As such, it is largely confined to Reagan’s second term, those incidents from late in Reagan’s first term — as well as some in the first Bush Administration, are mentioned. The book is not a chronological narrative, but rather four of them. The four sections of The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan focus on Reagan’s relationship with former President Richard Nixon, Regan’s relationship with author Suzanne Massie, the context of Reagan’s “tear down this wall” speech, and Reagan’s summits with Gorbachev.

Reagan and Nixon were contemporaries, though Reagan’s early life as a politician meant that he started behind Nixon’s position. Nonetheless, both men were deeply affected by early battles against American Communists. While Nixon worked on the House Unamerican Affairs Committee, Reagan was President of the Screen Actors Guild, and faced much more open Communist agitation and troublemaking. Both ultimately made peace with Communist governments in ways that were unexpected to the world, but consistent with long-held beliefs. Nixon was concerned about Soviet imperialism and the role of the Soviet Union as a large Eurasian land-power, and so was willing to support non-Soviet (but still totalitarian) forces on the rim of Eurasia, such as Maoist China. Reagan was hostile to totalitarianism, but not concerned about the mere presence of a large landpower that spanned Europe and Asia. Thus, Nixon would have been unlikely to make peace with the Soviet Union to the extent that Reagan did (and, together with Henry Kissinger, was highly critical of Reagan’s moves at the time). Likewise, Reagan’s concern with average human beings and hostility toward

totalitarianism would have made him more sympathetic to Breshnev’s Soviet Union than Mao’s China in the early 1970s.

Suzanne Massie wrote Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia. She is also an active writer and speaker — indeed, she has a website. She served as an unofficial intermediary between Reagan and the Soviet leadership. James Mann does not mention if there were other such intermediaries. Massie’s main contribution was to personalize and humanize the situation of average Russians for President Reagan. Many of Regan’s senior aids were concerned of the extent to which Massie may have been influenced by the KGB. Eventually, they succeeded in limiting her access to the President.

The most important words of the famous line, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!,” where the first two. The United States had consistently criticized the Berlin Wall,

and regularly called for its demolition. However, the social context of Reagan’s 1987 speech was a rise in German nationalism. At the time of the speech, the United States had used its role as one of Four / Quadruple powers to assert sovereignty of Berlin, and prevent West Berlin’s mayor from visiting the east. At the same time, Soviet and American introduction of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe lead to efforts by East Germany to work with West Germany to get rid of both sets of weapons. The German people and the East German government (though not the West German government) feared that the Soviet Union and NATO would be willing to wage a nuclear war if it could be limited to Germany.

Many American analysts felt that Soviet introduction of intermediate nuclear weapons was a mistake. When America introduced intermediate weapons as a response, these were much more tactically useful than soviet weapons. While any Soviet invasion of Europe that resorted to nuclear force would require missiles that would be launched from Soviet territory anyway, NATO intermediate weapons could be launched from Europe and hit the Soviet Union. Such weapons afforded America the possibility of maintaining territorial neutrality during a nuclear exchange between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, which would destroy both forces while leaving the United States the undisputed hegemon. In the Administration Reagan was relatively alone in viewing this outcome as unacceptable, and his diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev proceeded in spite of governmental hostility.

Mann argues that Reagan did not win the Cold War, but that he was not merely a lucky President, either. Rather, Reagan allowed Gorbachev to lose the Cold War in ways that other administrations would have been unable to. Reagan was the first President since Franklin Roosevelt who was not hostile to Soviet imperialism. Gorbachev was able to convince the Soviet power establishment not that the Union was economical disastrous (Which they knew before electing him), or that Moscow was on its way to being a third-rate power (which the Soviets realized organically as comparisons even war-torn Vietnam was somehow less “war torn” than Russia), but that the Party had a once-in-a-generation opportunity to turn things around without facing an American attack.

Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the only person who seemed to see the situation clearly was… Suzanne Massie. Massie emphasized to nearly everyone that there was no Soviet people, no Soviet society, and no Soviet sense of us-versus-them. There were only Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Kazakhs, and others, all hostile to the foreign Internationalist occupation of their countries. On Christmas Day, 1991, Gorbachev resigned. The Soviet Union would not see 1992.

After reading The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, the President reminded me of Mao Zedong. Like Mao, Reagan was able to brilliantly read his people, more comfortable in the poetics of politics than the details of policy, and deeply suspicious of formal structures. Also like Mao, Reagan disliked the formalities of the Presidency. Unlike Mao, of course, Reagan was not paranoid, and was not afflicted with totalitarian powers.

I have read every book James Mann has written. The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan reads as something of a prequel to Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. However, Mann has also written two excellent books on American policy toward China: About Face and The China Fantasy. However, little reference is made to China, even in areas (geopolitics, the events of 1989) where it would would make sense of the narrative.

I enjoyed The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan. It gave me a three-dimensional view of President Reagan and Gorbachev, who existed more as shadows in my historical imagination. Highly recommended.

Review of China’s International Behavior: Activisn, Opportunism, and Diversification by Evan S. Medeiros

Today I read China’s International Behavior, an up-to-the-minute analysis of China’s international relations, policies, and goals. The writing is up to date, and seems to have been completed around March 2009. The author, Evan S. Medeiros, argues that China’s foreign policy is driven by a perception that war between China and any other great power is unlikely for the next twenty years. Therefore, China’s foreign policy objectives for the next two generations are concerned with

1. Maintaining territorial sovereignty
2. Preventing de jure recognition of Taiwan’s independence
3. Promoting economic growth

In order to accomplish all of these things, China has adopted a form of multilateral counter-encirclement. Medeiros argues that while China is not hostile to the United States, Beijing is nonetheless afraid of potential conflict with the United States in the future. Therefore, China is busily attempting to build a network of friends and so-called “strategic partners” to prevent an encirclement and maintain access to the raw materials which fuel the Chinese economy.

Some of the most interesting parts of China’s International Behavior concern Russia. I was particularly interested in the (too-brief) Russian attempts to hijack the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to be a vehicle of Russian hegemony. In particular, Russia attempted to merge the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the club for China and her central Asian natural resource suppliers) with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (the new form of the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty framework). Widespread fear of Russian unreliability prevents this, however, and when Russia invaded Georgia, the SCO did not recognize the puppet states created by Moscow.

If the book has political implications, then it can be read as being the most coherent criticism of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy as I have ever read. The excellent concluding chapter argues that China has adopted a form of liberal internationalism, with the obvious exception of having no wish to promote democracy. 9/11 was a gift to China, as it diverted hostile factions in the administration from focusing on China. The Iraq War likewise promoted an opening, as China attempted to benefit from the rift between the United States and several of her traditional allies.

The book’s greatest weakness is that it does not put China’s foreign policy in its immediate context. Foreign policy under the “first generation” (from 1949 to about 1975) and “second generation” (from about 1975 to about 1995) was aimed at keeping mainland China united, and free from Russian domination. This is touched upon by the book. Likewise, foreign policy under the “fourth generation” (about 2002 through the present) is the focus of the book. However, the motives of the “third generation” of leadership is almost entirely ignored. In particular, the Presidency of Jiang Zemin (1993-2002) is neatly divided by his submission to Li Peng (the face of the Tiananmen Massacre, the adopted son of Zhou Enlai, and fellow alum of Ion Iliescu) through 1998, and his selection of Zhu Rongji (fluent English speaker, convicted as being a “Rightist” in 1958, and in charge of China’s accession to the WTO). While China’s multilateralism largely begins with the Jiang-Zhu team, this could have been better emphasized.

China is not just one of the world’s largest economies. It is now the Security Council’s largest contributor to UN Peace Keeping missions, and is actively attempting to secure peace by building friendships and alliances not only with other countries, but through multilateral institutions. China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification is a great book for anyone who wants to learn about how China is acting on the world stage.

Highly recommended.

Better Curricula

In spite of right-wing netroot anger, I give props to President Obama for pushing ahead with developing school curricula. Our educational system has serious problems, and we need federal intervention to compete with the rising powers in the world. Like President Bush (but unlike President Clinton), President Obama is shaping up to be a transformational President when it comes to education.

By encouraging (through various means) schools to focus on core classes, we can move away from teaching mere hobbies into creating a strong, 21st century workforce.

Our New Trade Policy

As far as I can tell, it is the following:

Borrow billions from China and other rising powers

Decree “Buy American” when it comes to government contractor purchases, to take market share away from Chinese companies

Subsidizing failing American companies (GM, Chrysler, etc) that compete against more efficient Chinese companies.

When decrees and subsidies don’t work, tax goods from China.

In other words, a complete disaster.